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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
This thesis will focus on relating a generic evaluation structure, the Modular
Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) to the battle management (BM)
and command, control and communication (C3) issues of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). To do this, the area of SDI battle management, command and
control (C2), and communications will be reviewed and explained as well as the MCES.
This will provide useful descriptive analysis required for identifying and measuring
proposed BM/C3 architectures.
B. SDI BACKGROUND
In March 1983, the President called for an intensive and comprehensive effort to
define a long-term research program with the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat
posed by nuclear ballistic missiles. This was called the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) and is commonly referred to as the "Star Wars" concept. Within a year, studies
concluded that powerful new technologies were becoming available that would justify
major new development efforts to provide future technical options for defense against
threatening nuclear ballistic missiles. In addition, a recommendation was made to
initiate a broad based research effort focused on establishing the technical feasibility to
permit a decision in the early 1990s on whether to proceed to system development of
the SDI system. The research started immediately and is on-going today.
The Strategic Defense Initiative's prime mission is to act as a deterrent for
nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), medium range ballistic missile
(MRBM), short range ballistic missile (SRBM), or submarine launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) strikes. Through enhanced simulation models and graphic capabilities,
analysts can conceptualize an attack by the Soviet Union on our cities, missile sites
and/or command centers. However, the question of the most optimal SDI system and
its associated BM/C3 architecture remains unanswered. As of today, there is not yet a
defined SDI program stating what or where the weapons, sensors, C3 systems and
supporting elements should be, nor how they should be arranged.
Efforts in the weapons research program have been pursuing two major weapon
concepts: kinetic energy and directed energy weapon capabilities. Kinetic energy
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weapons would include systems with the "smart" high speed kinetic kill projectile and
the hyper velocity repetitive pulsed rail guns with "smart" bullets. The directed energy
weapons systems may include neutral particle beams or free electron or chemical lasers.
The surveillance network may be comprised of the following sensor systems: the Space
Surveillance Tracking System (SSTS), Boost Surveillance Tracking System (BSTS), a
new concept of an Airborne Optical Surveillance (AOS) platform or any other separate
dedicated sensing systems. C3 systems would include such things as the computers and
communication systems needed to operate and control the previously mentioned
sensors and weapons, command facilities to house the hardware equipment and
personnel. Each of these components has the advantages and disadvantages of its
basing mode, whether space-based or ground-based. The space-based assets could be
configured to provide effective defense during the boost, post-boost and mid-course
phases of the threat trajectory. The, ground-based components might be used to
engage the threat during the late mid-course part of the threat trajectory and within the
atmosphere at both high and low altitudes. (Appendix A describes the physical
characteristics of the strategic defense problem by defining the boost, post-boost, mid-
course and terminal phases.) How these components should be arranged and interact
with each other is unknown and is a major system-level issue.
The community has accepted the concept of a multi-layered defense system with
each layer capable of performing independently the basic functions of threat detection,
tracking, identification, weapon assignment and weapon firing. In the "Report to the
Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative", it was stressed that:
One of our top priorities has been to examine multilavered defense architectures
and define major factors affecting technolosv decisions, such as threats,
survivability, lethality and affordabilitv. We need' to have the best understanding
of these issues so that we can chart' a clean course for the program. . . . the
importance of the results cannot be overstated. [Ref. 1: p. II-7J
Two years into the SDI research program, a panel of reputable industry,
government and academia personnel was formed, called the Eastport Study Group.
They analyzed the strategic defense battle management problem and provided valuable
information as well as recommendations to the SDIO BM/C3 Working Group on their
approach of addressing the SDI and BM/C3 architecture problems. Parts of their
report will be discussed here.
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In the Eastport Study Group Report three fundamental criterias were identified in
evaluating an SDI architecture: performance, testability and cost. [Ref. 2: p. 22]
Performance is difficult to quantify. There is no simple measure to evaluate the
performance of a strategic defense architecture because the design of the system must
be capable of responding to many different attack scenarios. This makes the
performance measure scenario dependent. However, many experts feel that the
number or fraction of warheads intercepted in an all out attack is a useful measure of
performance. In addition, other properties of an architecture, such as reliability,
durability, survivability and diversity may contribute to its performance.
The testablity of an architecture can be measured by the confidence with which
one can determine the performance of a deployed system. Because full-scale tests are
impossible, the system must be structured in a way such that its performance can be
inferred accurately from sn\all scale tests.
Last is the cost of the system. Cost is of obvious relevance and includes
components such as the cost of developing, building, deploying and maintaining the
system. Although the cost of building and deploying sensors and weapons is expected
to dominate the cost of a deployed system, the complexity of the battle management
and C2 software to control a given architecture must not be such that it could not be
produced at any cost.
One of the first recommendations by the Eastport Study Group was regarding
the organizational structure.
The battle management decisions should take place in a hishlv decentralized
framework, and that the svstem need not, and should not, be tightly coordinated.
[Ref. 2: p. 24]
They felt that lower level tasks should be delegated to and localized within parts
of a system. This formalized the "battle group" concept. A small battle group would
consist of several sensors and weapon platforms that would be within a few hundred
kilometers of each other and a few hundred kilometers above our missile launching
area [Ref. 2: p. 24]. The components would act as a unit, comparable to soldiers
fighting for the company commander, who in turn, has a chain of command for
coordination purposes. The designated battle manager local to that group would
combine the measurements made by the sensors in order to provide more accurate
tracking of the missiles. That information would then be used by the battle
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management system to assign the battle group weapons to intercept. Several battle
groups as well as battle managers may be needed to protect all of the United States
assets.
After one and one-half years of researching whether the SDI system should have
a centralized or a decentralized hierarchy (as that recommended by the Eastport Study
Group), Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, USAF, Director, SDIO, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, declared the SDI system should be of a decentralized
framework. He briefed this at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Third National C3I Policy Issues and Answers Conference, February 3, 1987, at the
Naval Postgraduate School. In addition, Lt Gen Abrahamson stated that the initial
system will address the missile defense problem as a two-tier approach, unlike the
Eastport Group Study recommendations of a three-tier approach. The first, and most
important, is the boost/mid-course, phase. The second is the late mid-course phase
with possible inclusion of the terminal phase.
A project at the Sandia National Laboratories in Livermore, California, is
progressing in unison with Lt Gen Abrahamson's brief. It fits into a decentralized
hierarchy framework and is limited to the late mid-course phase, or the second tier of
the "tier" approach. The analysts at Sandia have taken on a task of addressing a small
part of an SDI BM/C3 system. They are researching the on-board computational
capabilities (both software and hardware) required for the management of a SDI sensor
and weapon platform. They refer to this as the "Platform Manager Program" (PMP).
Specifically, they are analyzing the computational capabilities needed on-board a
platform for allocating and controlling its resources and examining the autonomous
(decentralized) decision-making capabilities of such a system. This "platform manager"
concept is similar for a discrimination platform, where the resources would include the
sensor systems onboard, as to a weapon platform, where the kill vehicles would be
considered the resources. The first exemplary case chosen to address this effort is a
"pop-up", sequential discriminator platform, for use in the late mid-course phase of the
missile trajectory.
The discrimination platform is kept on the surface of the earth until needed and
is then "popped" into space, hopefully, within range of the incoming warheads or
targets. Although the analysts at Sandia National Laboratories are continuously
addressing the software complication of this system, I was granted approval to identify
and address some relevant command and control issues of a dedicated discrimination
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platform such as this. To do this, I will apply the Modular Command and Control
Evaluation Structure (MCES) to a BM/C3 system with a platform manager onboard a
dedicated discrimination platform.
The MCES is a tool to assist the analyst in evaluating command and control
systems and architectures. A detailed explanation of the MCES will be covered in
Chapter 2, however, the next section will describe its conceptualization.
C. MCES BACKGROUND
Dr. Ricki Sweet, in her article "The Modular Command and Control Evaluation
Structure (MCES) Application of and Expansion to C3 Architectural Evaluation,"
reported that "There is a need as well as a requirement for generic tools to evaluate C2
systems and architectures." In addition, in the article "The Expert Team of Experts
Approach to C2 Organizations" Michael Athans, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, stated that:'
At the present time we do not have ... a systematic, analytical, quantitative
methodoloev that can be used to (1) Analvze the interactions between a fixed C2
organization and a fixed C3 system architecture, and (2) develop realiv
meaningful and relevant measures of effectiveness. [Ref. 3]
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), C3S, (now OJCS/J6)
recognized this lack of supporting resources for the C3 community and tasked several
individuals to solve this dilemma.
In 1984, Dr. Ricki Sweet and Lt Col Thomas Fagan III, USAF, chaired a
symposium to identify issues and topics that an analyst would address when evaluating
a command and control (C2) system in terms of its contribution to force effectiveness.
Working definitions, conceptual models, identification of measures of effectiveness,
evaluation techniques and approaches, and an overall appraisal of the current status
and future course of MOE analysis were topics addressed by the attendees at the
symposium [Ref. 4: pp. 24-27]. Since then, a series of workshops and symposia have
been held and effort has been spent to develop a general C2 evaluation methodology to
determine the force effectiveness of any C2 system. This led to the development of the
Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) Figure 1.1 displays the
MCES structure.
The MCES may be viewed as:
1. A structure to direct the evaluation of C2 architectures,
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Figure 1.1 Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES).
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3. A methodology which itself may be used for evaluation,
4. Employing a common structural treatment. [Ref. 4: pp. 6-8]
The MCES has been designed to be applicable to any C2 system, to be modified
or altered to fit any C2 system of interest and to evolve as new ideas and insights are
presented and included.
D. APPLICATION OF MCES TO SDI
An effort at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been directed towards the
application of MCES to various military command and control issues. Dr. Sweet,
together with Cdr. James OfTutt, USN (now retired), then SDIO, Dr. Thomas G.
Rona, Office of Scientific and Technology Policy, The White House, Dr. Michael
Sovereign, Chairman of the Joint C3 Academic Group, NPS, Dr. Conrad Strack,
Systems Planning Corporation, Dr. Harold Glazer, The MITRE Corporation, and Dr.
Mort Metersky, Naval Air Development Center (NADC), approached the problem of
identifying the measures used for evaluating SDI architectures through the application
of the MCES. The intent was to apply the MCES methodology to the production of
developmental gains for the SDI analytical community. After learning the MCES
methodology and recognizing the complexity of the BM/C3 architecture problem, I
wanted to apply the MCES to a smaller, well defined SDI C2 system, such as the
system of the Platform Manager Project.
This thesis will apply the MCES to evaluate the discrimination platform as a part
of a command and control system and address relevant issues in analyzing a BM/C3
architecture. Chapter 2 will give a brief background of the efforts of Dr. Sweet and
others to develop the MCES as well as a detailed explanation of the seven modules of
the MCES. The third chapter will highlight the discussions and measures identified at
the SDI MCES/MOE Workshop. Chapter 4 will address the functions of the
discrimination platform and its role in the SDI system while the fifth chapter will apply
the MCES to the command and control process of a BM/C3 system with a dedicated
discrimination platform system in a step by step manner. The sixth, and final, chapter
will summarize the application of the MCES to the C2 system and the discriminator
platform system.
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II. MODULAR COMMAND AND CONTROL EVALUATIONSTRUCTURE (MCES)
A. MCES DEVELOPMENT
A concentrated effort to develop the Modular Command and Control Evaluation
Structure (MCES) methodology started in 1984 with a decision to develop a generic
approach to evaluate any command and control (C2) system. "Generic", as used here,
refers to a model of sufficient generality to be applicable regardless of mission area,
Service, Command or C2 system. Additionally, the model would accommodate the
entire C2 system, including physical entities, structure, and its environment. The
objective was to develop a methodology that would address those issues to evaluate the
effectiveness of a particular C2 system of interest, and wherever relevant, to relate the
system to some measure of its contribution to force effectiveness.
In early 1985, the proceedings from the workshops, symposiums and personal
efforts were consolidated and the MCES evolved. Through support of the OJCS/C3S,
Dr. Ricki Sweet was tasked to synthesize all the work that had been done on the
MCES and begin the validation of the structure by using a set of application studies.
By 1986, under the joint sponsorship of the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS) and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)* six application topics were
identified and scoped to expand and test the MCES. By applying the MCES, the
intent was to specifically address the problem of how to evaluate the force effectiveness
of C2 systems. The individual programs are described in the subsequent sections.
[Ref. 4: pp. 27-30]
1. Army Tactical Problem
The Army Tactical architectural problem posed the question "How can the
SHORAD/FAAD Platoon command and control be improved to increase the number
of engagements of threat aircraft?" This was presented by Major B. Galing and Major
R. Wimberly of the TRADOC Research Element in Monterey, California.
2. Air Force Tactical Problem
The Air Force Tactical architectural problem centered upon the utilization of
the Identification Friend, Foe, Neutral (IFFN) testbed at Kirkland Air Force Base,
New Mexico, to evaluate the flow of C2 information throughout the C2 structure
specific to air defense. The question addressed was "How effective is the air defense C2
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system in providing decision makers the means to assess and employ air defense assets
to meet overall mission objectives?" Major P. Gandee, USAF, on behalf of Colonel
D. Archino, USAF, Test Director of the IFFN Test Bed, addressed this application in
his research thesis (Master of Science in System Technology-C3, 1986) while attending
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
3. Air Force Strategic Problem
The Air Force Strategic architecture problem was to perform a mission
analysis to define a concept definition for a strategic command and control system in
the 2000 time frame. This was brought by Major B. Thieman of OJCS C3S and Dr.
Rona of the Office of the Secretary of Defense/DASD.
4. Navy Tactical/Battle Force Problem
The Navy Tactical/Battle Force problem was to develop architectures for
battle force information systems. The architectures were to relate measures of
effectiveness of command and control of a Navy anti-air warfare (AAW) system, the
C2 process model and Navy functional How diagrams and descriptions (F2D2) process.
This was presented by Professor Dennis Mensh, NPS, on behalf of the Naval Surface
Warfare Center.
5. Joint Tactical Problem
The Joint Tactical architectural problem centered upon the definition of
measures to evaluate TADIL J communications protocol. This turned out to be two
problems:
a) The comparison of implementation with protocol specifications, and
b) Given implementation, the determination of how well the TADIL J system
supports required information exchanaes amone joint tactical data svstems
(TDS). ~
This was addressed by LT B. Nagy, USN, Naval Ocean Systems Center
(NOSC).
6. Joint Strategic Problem
The Joint Strategic architectural problem centered upon the development of
operations for C2 of ICBM launch detection (LD) sensors. This was brought by Dr.
M. Leonardo on behalf of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO).
Although the MCES methodology is constantly evolving to incorporate new
insights, it was these six projects that initiated the testing of the theoretical approach
and potential applications of the MCES. Through the direction of Dr. Sweet and the
work of student teams from the NPS and individual interests, three of the projects have
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been instrumental in the development of the MCES. The Air Force tactical and
strategic problems and the Navy tactical/battle force problem were successful in
providing vital information towards the development and evolution of the MCES. The
other three were discontinued due to limited resources and sponsorship of the problems
[Ref. 4: pp. 33-35]. In addition to Dr. Sweet's work, many experts in the C2 field are
evaluating and/ or using the MCES in their related work. Workshops and symposia are
held annually to discuss the issues involved in applying the MCES methodology. All
this inputs to the improvement of the MCES.
Before continuing, a detailed description of the MCES is in order to
completely understand the methodology and approach behind this model.
B. MCES MODULES DESCRIPTION
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) is a tool
which can assist an analyst in the evaluation of a command and control system. It is
composed of seven modules and a "Decision Maker" block. See Figure 2.1 . The
MCES begins with the "Problem Formulation" module and sequentially steps through
to the final module, "Aggregation of Data". All the modules are important, however,
the key module is "Specification of Measures". The first four modules are geared to
support the development of the relevant set of measures that will be descriptive of the
C2 system as a whole. The last two modules generate and aggregate the values of the
identified measures. Due to the complexity of some C2 systems, multiple iterations of
the entire MCES process may be required in a heirarchial fashion.
1. Module 1: Problem Formulation
The first module describes the initial step an analyst must accomplish in
evaluating a C2 system, "Problem Formulation". The analyst, along with the
operational user, must define the C2 problem through the development of a clear, well-
defined statement of the issue or question. As a result, appropriate scenarios, analysis
objectives, and the assumptions underlying the evaluation can be identified and the
criteria for selecting preferred solutions should be highlighted. See Figure 2.2 .
In addition, the analyst must recognize which phase of the life cycle the C2
system is in. The life cycle of a C2 system has been segmented into three phases:
concept definition, acquisition and operational. The objectives of each life cycle phase
are described below. [Ref. 5: p. 6-4]
(a) Concept Definition. Develop the total svstem and program requirements from
a broad system or mission objective. The characteristics of the svstem that
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Figure 2.2 Problem Formulation.
used to develop and define a cost-effective svstem that will satisfy the
operational mission. Implications of constraints are determined so that
realistic goals for the characteristics can be set.
(b) Acquisition Phase. Accomplish detailed engineering design. The svstem is
built and. tested to determine whether or not the svstem and its subsvstems
meet specifications. Engineering reviews and test programs are conducted.
(c) Operation Phase. Install the svstem. Operate and test the svstem in a
realistic operational environment.' Assess the capability of the svstem to meet
the eflectiveness requirements defined in the concept definition phase.
The identification of the system's life cycle is necessary' due to the fact that
different points in the life cycle determine which issues are of more concern to the
analyst, designer, program manager, and; or user, than others. These issues determine
the objectives of the analysis, which in turn directly influences the selection of
appropriate measures to be used in evaluating the system and assist the decision maker
in reaching a conclusion.
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2. Module 2: Bounding the System
The second module will bound the C2 system of interest. It's primary goal is
to delineate the difference between the system being studied and its environment. To
do this, the analyst must recognize the physical entities, structures and the command
and control process completed by the C2 system. Based on the Joint Chiefs of Stall
(JCS) definition of a command and control system, JCS Publication 2 states that a C2
system "consists of facilities, equipment, communication, procedures and personnel
essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of
assigned forces pursuant to the mission". [Ref. 6] Conforming to the JCS definition,
this three-dimensional definition of a C2 system (entities, structure and processes) are
defined as: [Ref. 5: p. 2-3]
(a) Physical Entities: Equipment, (e.g. computer and peripherals, modems,
antennas, local area networks), software, people and associated facilities;
(b) Structure: The arrangement and interrelationships of physical entities,
standard operating procedures, protocols, concepts of operation, and
information patterns such that command relationships and functional
representations are established. (Structure frequently reflects doctrine and
mav be scenario dependent) Such arrangements are often physical and
temporal.
(c) Command and Control Process: Refers to the system in its dynamic state.
"What is the system doing?" It reflects functio'ns carried out by the C2
system, i.e., sensing, assessing, generating, and selecting alternatives. It is the
behavior of the syslem.
In this module, the analyst must identify the composition of the C2 system
being evaluated. For example, physical entities could include the type of computer
being used and its physical location, such as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in
Colorado Springs. The structure may represent the organizational structure determined
by the C2 system architecture. This may include procedural control in a centralized or
decentralized hierarchy.
A graphic representation is often helpful in showing the levels of the C2
system, as defined by the physical entities and structure. This representation is called
the "Onion Skin", and can be seen on the lower part of Figure 2.3. It assists in
categorizing and identifying the system elements and their level of association with
each other. The measures defined below also depend on these relationships.
The final component is process. This is considered to be a dynamic state,
whereas entities and structure are more static. The analyst should identify what
functions the C2 system should be doing in order to complete the mission of the
system. For example, internal C2 processes may include detecting, identifying,









Figure 2.3 Bounding the System.
3. Module 3: C2 Process
In the third module, a conceptual model is used to relate those functions
identified in Module 2, to the C2 process of the C2 system being analyzed. Before any
further discussions of the "C2 Process" module, the Conceptual C2 Process Model, as
seen in Figure 2.4, must be introduced and explained.
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Figure 2.4 Conceptual C2 Process Model.
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The Conceptual C2 Process Model was developed to represent the basic
constituents of the most simple C2 processes, yet, is able to be applied to most
complex C2 systems. The six blocks on the left side of Figure 2.4 are the "functional"
blocks of the C2 process model. These functions operate upon and within a defined
environment. Actions within the process loop is initiated by a perceived divergence
from a desired state and the sensed environmental state. Definitions of the individual
functions are presented below [Ref. 5: p. 5-5].
a) Sense. A function which entails, gathering the data necessary to describe and
forecast the environment, which includes:
(1) Enemy forces' disposition and actions.
(2) Friendly forces' disposition and actions.
(3) Those aspects of the environment that are common to both forces, e.g.,
weather and terrain.
b) Assess. A function which transforms data from the Sense function into
information about intentions and capabilities of enemy forces and about
capablities of friendlv forces for the purpose of determining if deviation from
the Desired State warrants further action. It also integrates data with
intelligence for the same purpose.
c) Generate. A function which develops alternative courses of action to bring
the perceived environment closer to the desired state.
d) Select. A function which selects a preferred alternative from among the
available options. It includes evaluation of each option in terms of the criteria
necessary to achieve the Desired State.
e) Plan. A function which develops implementation details necessary to execute
the selected course of action.
Direct. A function which distributes decisions to the forces charged with the
execution of the decision.
A stimulus is an external input to the SENSE block. It is a result of either a
natural or human-initiated environmental effect. An action by our own forces as well
as by the enemy forces can create an alteration to the overall environment.
The DESIRED STATE block acts as an error function inside the loop. If the
actual state differs from the Desired State, the processing activity will continue in the
flow pattern seen in the Figure 2.4 . On the other hand, if the Desired State is believed
to be reached, processing activity is stopped until the system experiences a stimulus
which is sensed and assessed to be an undesirable state.
The basic model has a very simple form, with all of the functions performed
sequentially by the conceptual C2 system. A real system, however, may execute the
functions in a distributed way, and substantial interactions may exist among sets of C2
systems in the performance of the functions. Further, a given system may, at times,
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appear to omit some of the functions or have loops within the model that allow the
execution of the basic functions in a different order. Additionally, the conceptual
model does not explicitly represent time, even though it is recognized by the MCES
analyst that the timing and sequencing of the execution of the functions by a C2
system are major characteristics of the system.
The C2 Process Definition module is an important step for the analyst because
a detailed analysis must be made on the C2 system. The analyst must recognize the
environmental factors that can threaten the desired state of the system and identify the
functions of the C2 process for the stated problem. Then the analyst can map those
functions to the generic C2 process loop. As a result, by breaking the C2 process into
separate functions, appropriate attributes can be defined and used to measure each
function. See Figure 2.5 .
4. Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions
The fourth module, "Integration of System Elements and Functions," relates
the C2 process, physical entities, and structure to form the architecture of the C2
system. See Figure 2.6 . Dr. Sweet defined "architecture'' as "an integrated set of
systems whose .physical entities, structures and functionality are coherently related".
The structural framework should be arranged so the system entities have identifiable
functions that are performing the previously specified C2 process.
In some studies, identifying the flow of information through the C2 system
may help derive a hierarchial relationship between individual C2 functions and to form
an architecture. Two techniques have been applied to model information flow through
the C2 process model: Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) and Petri-Nets.
In an air defense study for the Identification, Friendly, Foe, Neutral (IFFN)
Joint Test Force (JTF), Major Pat Gandee applied a specific design tool call DATA-
FLOW ORIENTED DESIGN, that used the data flow diagrams to model information
flow. In his thesis, Major Gandee describes the technique as:
Data flow oriented design provides a natural methodoloev for describing a
command and control system. It allows us to use data flow diagrams to show
the input, output relationships that exist within a C2 system [Ref. 77 p. 4SJ.
The detailed application of this procedure to the air defense C2 process is
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Figure 2.5 C2 Process.
The data flow diagrams can assist in defining the hierarchial "structure" in
'terms of the information How between functions within the C2 process. This produces
an organizational structure, which could reside in a single node or be distributed
between command nodes or between command nodes and weapons. Thereafter, those
physical entities (man and or machine), which perform functions are mapped to the
output from the functions.
5. Module 5: Specification of Measures
In the fifth module, guidelines are provided to identify, develop and select

























Figure 2.6 Integration of System Elements and Functions.
appropriate to the problem being evaluated. The analytical community has developed
a set of terms relating the ditlerent types of measures needed for a C2 system. See
Table 1 . Although there is debate on how these measures can be stringently defined
so as to be comprehensive and distinguishable from one another, the following
definitions were presented and used at the C2 Evaluation Workshop [Ref. 5: p. 2-4].
(a) Dimensional Parameters. Properties or characteristics inherent in the phvsical
entities whose values determine system behavior and the structure under
question even when at rest (i.e., size, weight, aperture size, capacitv, number
of pixels, luminosity).
(b) Measure of Performance (MOP). Closelv related to inherent parameters
(phvsical and structural) but measure attributes of system behavior (i.e., gain
throughput, error rate, signal-to-noise ratio).
(c) Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). Measure of how the C2 svstem performs its
functions within an operational environment (i.e., nrobablitv of detection,





Mission Oriented Relates to force/system mission
•
Discriminatory Identifies real difference between
alternatives
Measurable Can be computed or estimated
Quantitative Can be assigened numbers or
ranked
Realistic Relates realistically to the C2
system and associated uncertainties
Objective Can be defined or derived, independent
of subjective opinion. (It is
recognized 'that some measures
cannot be be subjectively defined
Appropriate Relates to acceptable standards and
• analysis objectives
Sensitive Reflects changes in system variables
Inclusive Reflects those standards required
by the analysis objectives
Independent Is mutually exclusive with respect
to other measures
Simple Is easily understood by the user
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(d) Measure of Force Effectiveness (MOFE). Measure of how a C2 svstem and
the force, (sensors, weapons, C2 svstem, and structure) of which it' is a part,
performs missions (contribution to "battle outcome).
From the dynamic standpoint, MOPs are used to measure how well a
particular function of the C2 process model is performed; MOEs measure the
integration of all C2 functions of the process model in terms of the mission being
addressed, and MOFEs relate the C2 system to the force, including weapon
capabilities. The same terms can be appropriately applied to C2 system statics as well
as to represent integration of statics and dynamics. These measures will provide a
standard for comparison as the underlying architecture of the C2 system is
reconfigured.
Previous studies have shown that a good starting point for developing
measures is to look at the C2 process. Recall the C2 process consists of sense, process,
assess, generate, select, plan and direct. These C2 functions could make up the
individual MOPs, which, as a set, could contribute to the overall MOE. The C2
process is done to control "our forces" within an environmental context. If there was a
way to measure each function's capabilities, then that would represent a set of
measures of the control that the force has within the environment. Thus, the C2
system can be measured by the set of MOEs from the entire C2 process. See Figure
2.7.
Relating MOEs to MOFEs and thereby evaluating C2 systems is a complex
issue. The precise combination of measures used depends upon the analysis objectives,
conceptual model, boundaries and the nature of the analysis. The application
determines whether to evaluate the force effectiveness or simply the performance of a
given system. The level of the C2 analysis impacts upon the specification of the
boundaries for the model.
6. Module 6: Data Generation
The sixth module, as shown in Figure 2.8, recognizes the need to develop a
data generator which will provide values for the measures identified in the previous
module. Data of this sort has routinely come from analystical tools and available
resources to model and/ or test system and subsystems capabilities and the overall force
effectiveness of the system. Testbeds, simulation models and experiments are an
example of possible data generators. Although the data generator may be difficult to















Figure 2.8 Data Generation.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The MCES as developed through meetings, applications, studies and discussions,
has provided the community with a theoretical framework for top level problem
specification. Testing the MCES with real world military' problems has demonstrated
it's use as a tool for evaluating the effectiveness of command and control systems. It
has also provided: [Ref. 4: p. 116]
(a) A svstems theorv approach to an integrated view of the C2
system: architecture being evaluated;
(b) A vehicle for the integration of disparate tools;
(c) A standard vocabulary which is beginning to be accepted and used within the
analytic community;
(d) The guidance for analytic studies; and
(e) A management support with a decision support system to do architectural
comparisons.
Efforts continue to further develop and use the MCES methodology. Dr. Sweet
continues to discuss its wide and potential applications with the analytical community











Figure 2.9 Aggregate the Data.
the Joint Command, Control and Communication program at the Naval Postgraduate
School, where enrollment includes ollicers from all branches of the military' with a wide
variety of military expertise in several different areas.
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III. SDI MCES/MOE WORKSHOP
A. OVERVIEW
There has been extensive interest in the continuing evaluation of measurable
quantities of C2 systems, as described previously. At the 1986 Evaluation of C2
Systems Workshop, the Joint Strategic Working Group addressed the SDI C2 issue of
assigning functions of a physical entity such as a sensor platform so measures (MOPs,
MOEs, and MOFEs) could be identified and system effectiveness could be evaluated.
The results of the workshop showed promising developments towards identifying
appropriate measures for an evaluation plan for competing SDI architectural concepts.
Dr. Sweet, under sponsorship of NADC and SDIO, further tested the MCES as a tool
for user designated problems in the evaluation of C3 systems by co-chairing an SDI
Workshop to extend the work done at the 1986 Evaluation of C2 Systems Workshop.
During 9-11 September, 1986, forty-five SDI and MCES evaluation experts attended
the SDI MCES/MOE Workshop in Washington, D.C.
B. SDI MCES/MOE WORKSHOP OBJECTIVE
The objective of the SDI MCES/MOE Workshop was: [Ref. 8: p. 2]
Develop measures appropriate for the evaluation problems within four critical
SDI arenas bv using the MCES. The Working Groups, the four arenas and their
chairmen are listed below:
(a) Working Group 1: The Overall SDI Architecture was chaired by Dr. Thomas
P. Rona, Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of Science and Technology.
(b) Working Group 2: Key Architectural Trade-offs was chaired bv Dr. Conrad
Strack, System Planning Corporation.
(c) Working Group 3: BM/C3 Systems was chaired bv Dr. Michael G. Sovereign,
Naval Postgraduate School.
(d) Working Group 4: SDI Software was chaired bv Dr. Harold Glazer, The
Mitre Corporation.
Dr. Sweet co-chaired the workshop with Commander James OfTutt, USN, SDIO.
Commander OfTutt, in his opening briefing at the workshop, described two cases of the
BM/C3 evaluation problem. The first case was described as that of the C2
system/architecture overall assessment. This included not only reviewing the
performance requirements, but also, measuring the effectiveness of the B.VI/C3 system.
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The second case presented was that of comparing the performance of alternative
architectures. As an example, Commander OfTutt addressed a five-battle group array
and a fifteen battle group array with alternative command and control concepts, i.e.,
centralized versus a distributed hierachial setup. He went on to say,
I'm not sure in my own mind what it is we are looking for to measure the
effectiveness of this architecture (five-battle group arrav) versus the other (fifteen
battle group arrav) . . . this measure of effectiveness is a problem.
This tasked the Workshop members to determine the correct measures to
evaluate any candidate architectures submitted as an entire SDI system.
C. WORKING GROUP CONCLUSIONS
The intent of this section is to briefly discuss the workings and findings of the
two Working Groups dealing with the command and control architectural issues:
Working Group 2: Key Architectural Tradeoffs, and Working Group 3: BM/C3
Systems. The results of each group's discussions of the step-by-step flow of the VICES
can be reviewed in Dr. Sweet's proceedings of the Workshop, entitled: The SDI
MCESIMOE WORKSHOP.
The following sections are a combination of the discussions taken place at the
Workshop and some drawn conclusions. It should be emphasized that both Working
Groups 2 and 3 accepted and extensively used the SDI BM/C3 Working Group for
Standards Functional Decomposition booklet produced by the SDI Program Office,
Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. This document contains the top level
decomposition of SDI BM/C3 functions as determined by the BM/C3 Working Group
for Standards. Although both Working Groups felt this document was incomplete, it
provided the essential top level functions needed to address any BM/C3 architecture.
In addition, both Groups directed their elTorts towards the operational SDI
architecture. Working Group 2 approached the mission level issues of the architectural
components for the SDI system while Working Group 3 addressed and identified
system level issues for the BM C3 architectures.
1. Key Architectural Tradeoffs Working Group
Working Group 2, Key Architectural Trade-ofTs, first identified three missions
of an SDI system: deterrence, protection and escalation control.
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Deterrence has been the goal of the entire SDI research work since its
announcement by President Reagan. The intent is to show that the United States can
make the success of any attack so uncertain that an adversary would not attempt
aggression in the first place. This is based on the assumption that no rational
aggressor is likely to contemplate nuclear conflict when the ability to penetrate the
defensive system and destroy our retaliatory capability remains uncertain.
Working Group 2 identified five ways through which deterrence could be
accomplished:
1) Inform friendly and foe populace of the system and our intentions.
2) Integrate the system with other systems and forces during exercises.
3) Demonstrate the system by actually using it.
4) Practice self-defense in tests and exercises:
5) Maintain the "system by directing resources towards evolution.
On the other hand, in the case where deterrence may fail, a ballistic missile
defense would offer the only hope of protecting U.S. people, forces and C2 networks
against a missile attack . Working Group 2 categorized the U.S. assets based on
capabilities and placement of the assets. The group first recognized the importance of
the National Command Authority and its C3 assets. Without protecting our chief
commander and maintaining his ability to control our strategic forces, the initial strike
could impede our ability to order a retaliatory strike. Lastly, the group recognized the
importance of protecting the human population and the Allied Forces.
Finally, an SDI derived defensive system should be developed with the ability
to control escalation. A ballistic missile defense linked to strong air defenses, would
tend to stop nuclear war at relatively low levels of violence. Defenses of this type
could help conventional forces by protecting vulnerable rear areas. Escalation control
was designated in terms of phases and actions, such as attack assessment, stepped
response to avoid premature decisions and informing the enemy as to our intent.
Working Group 2 derived measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) based on
these missions. Identifying the MOFEs for the deterrence was based on the visible
indicator of the opponents beliefs or reactions. An example of this is the recent
summit meeting between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and
Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986 (after the SDI
MCES/MOE Workshop). In a series of head to head meetings over arms control, the
two men came close to agreeing on a plan to eliminate nuclear weapons, however,
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President Reagan would not give up the SDI research program for a returned
agreement to reduce nuclear arms. When President Reagan refused to end the SDI
program, Mr. Gorbachev ended the summit and reported to the media that it was a
missed opportunity to reduce nuclear weapons. This reaction revealed the value of the
SDI program to the Soviet military' program.
Table 2 lists possible deterrent techniques and various "visible indicators"
identified by the group members. Deterrent techniques could include such actions as
informing other countries and the US populace of the intent behind the SDI system
and its capabilities, flexing the system by showing individual subsystem capabilities and
performances, and demonstrating the system by actually firing weapons at targets in
selective tests and exercises. In addition, advocating the defensive nature of the system
as a protection against a nuclear attack and not as an offensive weapon was another
deterrent technique.
There are several indicators that would reveal the opposition's belief of our
deterrent approach. Such reactions to the techniques could include a commitment of
manpower and monetary resources to build a comparative, if not better, system, a
change in military doctrine and tactics, an increase in surveillance and intelligence
gathering, and the display of negative propaganda towards the use and the reasons for
such a system.
TABLE 2







MOFEs = visible indicators of
opponent belief (reaction)
- "Rubles Response"





Working Group 2 derived the MOFEs for the "Evolutionary Protection
Mission" as being a multiplicative function of the weighted values of the protected
system, population or site, the probability of protecting the designated site, the
numbers that can be protected and for how long. See Table 3 . However, to further
decompose the system, the group found that casual links among system components
and its hierarchy provided an elegant strategy for integrating the components, their











MOFE = F(W, P,X,i)
W = value of Ith tvpe of asset
P = probabilitv ofprotection
X = number of Ith type of asset
t = time
Value lies in survival of functions
such as hisher authority, warning
assets, emergency action network
Value lies in perceived and actual
net retaliatory all-source power
Value lies in survival of actual
entities, not just functions
As mentioned earlier, Working Group 2 accepted the functional
decomposition as stated by the BM/C3 Working Group for Standards, but rearranged
them to reflect the processes of a C3/BM system. First the system must detect, track
and classify missiles through a SURVEILLANCE system. Next it must determine
which weapons are capable of intercepting the missile and effectively assign or allocate
those weapons capable of engagement. This is BATTLE MANAGEMENT. Last is
FIRE/WEAPON CONTROL. The weapon system must be controlled so that
individual weapons can acquire, track and engage assigned targets. The Group also
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identified subfunctions under these primary functions. Those are designated by the




1.1 Execute Surveillance Commands
1.2 Detection and Aquisition
1.3 Track Formation
1.4 Obtain Discrimination Data
1.5 Obtain Kill Assessment Data
1.6 Report Back
1.7 Maintain Surveillance Data Base
1.8 Maintain Health and Status
2.1 BATTLE MANAGEMENT
2.1.1 Execute BM Commands
1.2 Tactical Situation Assessment
1.3 Response Plan Selection
1.4 Resource Tasking
1.5 Kill Assessment
1.6 Report Back and Handover
1.7 Maintain Battle Management Data Base
l.JS Maintain Health and Status
3.1 FIRE/WEAPON CONTROL




3.1.5 Maintain Fire, Weapon Control Data Base
3.1.6 Maintain Health and Status
The three primary functions lead to the identification of measures to test the
performance of the three components that make up an architecture to complete those
functions. The components are - the surveillance system(s), the BM/C3 system(s) and
the weapon(s). Each of the components were evaluated individually and were assessed
by focussing upon their "contributing attributes". Those addressed by the group are
listed below.
1) Range and resolution capabilities can be used to measure the effectiveness of
sensors, in terms of mission performance.
2) Speed, range, effective capabilitv, environment and countermeasures
contribute to the measurement of weapon effectiveness.
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3) Connectivity and capacity are seen as effecting a MOE representing the
BM/C3 component.
Working Group 2 was instrumental in identifying key issues and possible
measures for the evaluation of the SDI system, however, time constraints limited their
discussion to selected topics.
2. BM/C3 Systems Working Group
Working Group 3 also used the MCES methodology in identifying the
measures for evaluating the effectiveness of a BM/C3 architecture to support the
deterrence mission. With this recognition, three MOFEs for the BM/C3 system were
identified.
(a) The ability to place the right ordnance on the right target at the right time.
(b) Direction of change in the degree of the risk of war.
(c) Extent to which uncertainty among Soviet planners is increased, which is a
measure of deterrence independent of actual warfighting.
This Working Group, as did Working Group 2. approached the operational
SDI system, therefore, stated that the objective of the BM/C3 system as that of "The
ability of placing the right ordinance on the right target at the right time." The group
felt this was quantifiable by measuring the number of threat targets engaged within the
window of opportunity, however they recognized the need to identify the functions
required to accomplish this mission. After hearing Working Group 2's presentation on
how they decomposed the top level functions (listed in Table 4) Working Group 3
accepted their list and worked from that. Specifically, Working Group 3 addressed the
subfunctions identified under the three primary' functions. [Ref. 9: p. 8]
The Working Group had broken the BM/C3 system into four components.
Targets, sensors, weapons and communication systems. Each component had several
identifiable subfunctions, of which, many were discussed by the Group. One
subfunction discussed in detail was matching weapons with targets, or "1.2.4 -
Resource Tasking". Parts of the discussions are described below.
To fire accurately, the BM/C3 system must know at each instant of time the
location of the weapon platforms and their state of readiness. In addition, the system
must know the targets state vector and signature, and the probability of killing the
target given its location, trajectory, distance and velocity. This prompted the Working
Group to develop lists of target and weapon data needed for weapon target matches.




* History of state vector
* Classification
- accuracy of signature and vector state
- time




Both Tables identify the use of "state vectors." I will take some time to
explain this term and its usage. State vector has become an accepted term for the SDI
community. Although many readers may know the elements that represent the state
vector, in the book, Astrodynamics: Orbit Determination and Space Navigation, author
Samual Herrick discusses the term in the following manner:
In recent vears, and especiallv in optimization theorv and in some of the
statistical a'spects of correction" theorv, the "orbit" is often referred to as the
"state vector or "state." These terms" came to be applied to the "orbit" partly
because of lack of acquaintance with the fact that the six components of position
and velocitv on anv elate are often selected for the elements of orbit. [Ref. 10: p.
127]
' ' if
The elements of an orbit are a selected set of six mutually independent
integration constants. It is these six constants that distinguish one orbit from another.
These elements are:
(a) a = semi major axis, or mean distance
(b) e = eccentricity




* Probability of Kill (as a function of)
- geometry
- target hardness












(d) i = inclination
(e) L = longitude of the ascending node
(f) w = argument of the perifocus
Integration and manipulation of these six components through established
equations and multiple state vector acquisitions can provide information on the launch
point, the distance and time of flight from the launch point to the impact point, and
the velocity of the vehicle. Further information on these elements and advanced
equations are available in most orbitology books.
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Other characteristics of the target properties include the time and number of
objects that can be classified, a target's resistance of indention, deformation or
destruction by another object (this is often called the "hardness" of the target) and any
opposing or retaliatory measures of the targets. Weapon characteristics includes the
probability of a particular weapon destroying the target, the area of threat engagement,
often called the engagement envelope or battle space, and the survivability of the
weapon. The probability of destroying the target would have to include such factors as
the location of the weapon versus the target, the hardness of the target and the
lethality of the weapon being used. The engagement envelope would take into account
the cycle time of the weapon, the range of the weapon and possibility of targeting our
own missile. Survivability would have to take into consideration the capability to
rapidly replace any damaged or destroyed weapon systems, the hardening of the
weapon, and any means of self-protection.
4. Continuation of Working Group 3
Knowing that some targets are more important than others, the Working
Group recognized the need to prioritize the targets before an assignment of a weapon
to a target can be made. To do this, the BM/C3 system must first classify the targets
and then prioritize them. Classification must be completed by identifying its launch
sites, trajectory, state vector and signature. Once classified, the prioritation of targets
can be based on its location, its destructive power, and the value of the asset that it is
threatening. Through aggregation, the following measure of effectiveness was
identified: Expected percent of threat value destroyed by available weapons.
Three subfunctions were addressed by the Group. These were EXECUTE
SURVEILLANCE COMMANDS (1.1.1), DETECTION AND ACQUISITION (2.1.2)
and TRACK FORMATION (2.1.3). Under each of these, the Group identified
measures of effectiveness for that subfunction and possible measures of performance.
These are listed in Table 7 .
Realizing the importance of each component and its associated functions and
subfunctions, the Group felt that in order for the BM/C3 system to succeed in
accomplishing its primary mission, the architecture had to handle an integration of
complete and accurate information flow and highly coordinated data bases while
completing those component functions. This is shown graphically in Figure 3.1 . The
Working Group discussed several architectural tradeoffs by considering different
operational concepts in the context of the BM/C3 structure. These included additional




1.1.1 EXECUTE SURVEILLANCE COMMANDS
Measure: Desired coverage achieved as a function of:
* Probability of command received
* Probability of command understood
* Probability* of command acknowledged
* Probability of command executed
1.1.2 DETECTION AND ACQUISITION
Measure: Situation plot versus ground truth
* Percent targets acquired
* Mean time to detect
* Mean time to acquire
* Mean time to resolve clusters
1.1.3 TRACK FORMATION
Measure: Percent objects in track.
* Percent objects correctly typed
* Percent duplicate tracks
* Mean trackina error
* Percent false Tracks
* Mean time for stereo track
Through the discussions, several general MOPs became evident. One was the
time needed to perform a function. Another was how well those functions were
performed, for example, the accuracy of classifying targets. And lastly, the
completeness of the function, such as the type and number of objects that can be
classified simultaneously. In addition to the MOPs relating to the dynamics of the
system, or its functions, other generic MOPs were related to the entities themselves,
such as survivability and readiness.
D. WORKSHOP SUMMARY
All four Working Groups felt insufficient time was available to address a number
of complex evaluation issues for SDL However, throughout the workshop, it became
apparent that development measures, or crude evaluation structures are needed to
define the individual problem areas. The Workshop fell short of identifying all those




Figure 3.1 System Integration.
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further recommended that the panel should be broken into two subsections: an
architectural level MOE panel and a system level MOE panel. The architectural panel
would continue to identify measures for comparing BM/C3 architecture while the
system panel would address the design and architecture of the entire SDI system.
These would closely relate to the tasks as those stated for Working Group 2 and 3.
These measures, if properly identified and evaluated during simulation models,
experiments or exercises, should assist is evaluating the technical feasibility of an SDI
system and help determine whether the program should move from the preconcept and
definition stage of the life cycle to full scale development.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
To date, group and individual efforts are addressing the relevant issues in
evaluating the effectiveness of command and control architectures. Some groups are
looking at existing C2 systems while others, such as the SDI C2 system, are planning
and defining future systems. The MCES is a tool that can be used to address many of
these issues. At the start of this Chapter, some of the major events that led to the
development and testing of the MCES were described. A description of the MCES was
needed so the methodology behind the seven modules was described followed by
highlights of the two Working Groups efforts in use of the MCES to identify and
develop command, control and communication measures needed to evaluate the
architectures of the SDI system. After participating in Working Group 3, I accepted
the challenge of continuing the efforts of the Group but with a smaller, more defined




After attending the SDI MCES/MOE Workshop, the problem of trying to
analyze and evaluate a battle management and command, control and communication
(BM/C3) architecture became quite clear. The complexity of the sensors, weapons and
battle management systems and the uncertainty of technology and how they should be
interconnected not only added to the frustration of trying to build an architecture, but
more importantly, complicated the identification of the measures required to evaluate
the performance of a system as large as SDI. The BM/C3 system could have hundreds
of weapons systems, sensors and surveillance systems, located anywhere from the
surface of the earth up to geosynchronous orbit in space. Command centers must
operate and control these systems as well as combine and update the data provided by
the systems. The coordination requirements could become phenomenal with the
communications, data processing and software needed to operate such a system. It is
for this reason I chose to evaluate a smaller BM/C3 system, using the "Platform
Manager Program" (PMP) concept in addressing command and control issues of an
SDI BM/C3 system.
While attending the SDI MCES/MOE Workshop in September 1986, I met Dr.
Miriam John, one of the many analysts working on some aspect of the SDI research
program. Dr. John and her staff, particularly Dr. Larry Brandt and Dr. Richard
Wheeler, all from the Sandia National Laboratory, are researching on-board control of
autonomous, or nearly autonomous, weapon and sensor platforms. They called this
effort the Platform Manager Project (PMP). The concept behind the PMP is to
analyze and evaluate the computational requirements of an on-board "platform
manager". The late mid-course discriminator is the first case chosen for this analysis.
In this case, through sequential target handling, the platform manager would manager
and allocate the platform's sensors so detection and discrimination of incoming
warheads in the late mid-course phase would be accomplished. After initial discussions
with Dr. John, I decided to use the MCES as a tool to identify measures and address
command and control issues of this discrimination platform in a BM/C3 system.
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The Eastport Study Group initially recommended that the coordination required
for each phase of the defense should use a decentralized and loosely coordinated
approach to battle management. This was further briefed by Lt Gen. Abrahamson as
an acceptable approach to the hierarchal structure for the SDI system. This directly
related to the basic principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. The
SDI command and control system would have a central control node with a single
strategic defense commander for coordinating efforts of the forces' command and have
subordinate nodes for execution of operations. Lower echelon commanders would
have wider use of judgement in employing the capabilities and characteristics of the
ballistic missile system. The Sandia PMP is consistent with the Eastport Study
Group's recommendation and Lt Gen. Abrahamson's approach to decentralize the
BM/C3 architecture. The initial PMP technology has limited range so a single
discriminator platform could protect a limited area (e.g. a group of silos or a localized
command center). The activities of the platform would be coordinated to a localized
command center as a lower echelon command node. This approach makes the
discriminator platform and a command center a viable single-layer BMC3 system that
could be a deployable system in any proposed multi-layer BM C3 system.
The initial concepts have the discriminator platform operating in the late mid-
course/ terminal phase of the missiles trajectory. This, too, is consistent with Lt Gen
Abrahamson's comments at the AIAA conference of a "tier defense"—the first tier
being the boost/post boost phase and the second tier being the mid-course phase with
the possibility of the terminal phase as the third tier.
B. SANDIA PMP PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The BM/C3 system incorporating a platform manager on a discriminator
platform is only a small segment of the entire BM/C3 architecture, but it, too, must
address similar command and control issues as those discussed by the BM/C3 Working
Group of the SDI MCES MOE Workshop. Before continuing, an explanation of the
initial case study for the PMP due.
1. Platform Manager Program Concept
The platform will have sensors that will track reentry vehicles, decoys, chaff
and other debris and provide data that will help discriminate targets that are reentry'
vehicles from others that are considered less significant. Hence, it is referred to as a
dedicated discrimination platform. The Platform Manager Project (PMP) uses the
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dedicated discrimination platform in a "pop-up" basing mode. In this scheme, the
platforms are kept on the surface of the earth until needed and then "popped-up" into
space with a predetermined trajectory. The intent is to have the platform follow a
trajectory such that the reentry vehicles pass through the platform's sensing field,
commonly referred to as it's "field of view". If the platform sensors are able to acquire
the targets and discriminate the threatening targets from decoys or other debris, then
the target's tracking information and state vector can be relayed to either a weapon
system or command center, or both, so action can be taken. Figure 4.1 shows this
scenario.
The basing mode and the operational concept behind the platform
dramatically increase the survivability of the system during a conflict. These surface-
based systems would be placed in friendly territory where physical protection is
maximum. It attempts to overcome the enormous vulnerability problem with the space
based systems. In space, systems can be tracked and monitored by the Soviets at all
times and are vulnerable to the Soviet anti-satellite system or their space mine
destructive capabilities. In addition to the physical protection, the platform's
trajectories will be unpredictable by the enemy due to the number of possible launch
trajectori.es. This would prevent, or drastically hinder, the Soviet's ability to launch the
missiles with a flight path that would not enter into the platform's detection range.
Due to its basing mode, the weight of the platform plays an important role in
its launching capabilities. The uncertainty of the weight has a direct impact on the size
of the booster required for launching the platform into high altitude, say, several
kilometers up from the surface of the earth. Taken into consideration the latest
technology of the the sensor systems and booster capabilities, initial studies have
shown that the weight of the platform shouldn't pose any problems with the operation
of this system.
2. Detail System Description
Before launching, an early warning surveillance system must detect the
enemy's attack and determine probable missile trajectories. The pop-up platform
requires prior notification of an oncoming threat so it can be boosted out of the
atmosphere to engage the oncoming threat. (The particular discrimination technology
employed requires a high altitude line of sight between the platform and the target).
There are several existing and planned surveillance systems to do this. The first system

































sensors should detect the booster's flame and provide launch point and launch count.
A second system, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) can also track
the missiles. This system is designed not only to confirm an attack, is underway, but
also to provide impact predictions. For warning of SLBM attacks, the early warning
satellite system is complimented by PAVE PAWS phased-array radar systems. These
are strategically located at three different sites in the U.S. so their radar sweeps cover
the entire continent.
In addition to these systems, future warning systems are being researched and
developed. One such system is the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS).
This system is being designed for the boost phase. It will provide rapid and reliable
warning of attack as soon as a launch occurs. For accurate and efficient tracking in
the boost/post-boost phases, the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS)
concept is being considered. The SSTS would provide a nearly real-time, fully
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responsive space-based system for surveillance and tracking, and timely satellite attack
warning and verification, also provide the tracking data for hand-off to the late mid-
course and terminal phase sensor systems.
If the warning and surveillance systems reflect that the missiles have a
trajectory such that the reentry vehicles are within the platform's sensing field, then a
command must be issued to launch the discrimination platform. Once given, the
platform will "pop-up" off the surface of the earth via a planned trajectory. The
platform will have an attitude control system so that the on-board sensors can be
pointed, but the area coverage of the sensor systems will be limited. Once the
launching boosters bum out, the platform will have a translational motion as that of a
free falling body. Therefore, not only does the platform have a limited coverage, it has
a limited life-time, too.
Once in flight, several sensing subsystems must coordinate activities and
information if the platform is to succeed in its primary mission of tracking missiles and
discriminating between real warheads and decoys. The first sensor would be an
acquisition sensor. A most likely candidate for this would be a passive infrared sensor,
called a "staring" sensor. It will scan its field of view for threatening warheads. The
main objective is to determine the locations of the targets from the platform and the
number of targets within "prepartitioned areas" representing its field of view. These
prepartitioned areas may be thought of as a two-dimensional graph, as seen in Figure






Figure 4.2 Sensor "Prenartitioned Areas
Concept.
correspond to an area on the graph. The size of the area is still being researched,
however, this information will identify the area or areas with the highest concentration
of detected targets. Range information and detailed resolution are not within the
limited capabilities of the staring system due to the limited information that can be
extracted from an IR sensing system. The information about the areas of higher
concentration rates will be used by the "platform manager" to assign a second sensor of
the platform to further assess the targets.
The second major sensor onboard the platform is the tracking sensor. The
information from the staring sensor must be processed by the platform manager such
that the tracking sensor will continue to scan the areas identified by the acquisition
sensor. Because of the accuracy needed in generation of track files, this second sensor
is likely to be an active sensor, such as a laser radar, commonly called a LADAR. This
sensor generates the fine tracking information needed to point an onboard directed
energy beam at the target for discrimination.
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After track information of the targets becomes available, the platform
manager processes the information to control the platform resources. The primary
resources to be allocated is the charged particle beam which is sequentially aimed at
the incoming targets. It is the interaction of this beam with the targets that permits
the discrimination of reentry vehicles from decoys. This is done by probing the targets
with a directed energy beam such that radiation scatters or bounces off the nuclear
warheads with identifying signatures. The signatures must be received by the platform
and processed by the platform manager for complete target discrimination.
The LADAR high-resolution capabilities and the platform manager processing
capabilities will enable the system to maintain and update the state vectors, status and
locations of all threatening warheads and probable impact points. This highly defined
and accurate tracking data must be sent to the command center to determine which
weapon systems are capable of intercepting the threatening warheads and which targets
should be intercepted first.
The command center is considered the battle manager of this system. Once
the information is received, by the command center, threat assessment must take place.
The data from the estimated impact points can be used to evaluate the threats posed
by the reentry vehicles. Then, through effective manipulation of information about the
defensive battle, that information can be used to priorize the warheads and allocate
individual targets or groups of targets' to a weapon or weapon platform according to
weapons system location and capability of intercepting the threatening warheads. The
basic idea is to optimize 'weapons assignment based on the weapons' and missiles'
positions and capabilities to avoid expending multiple shots at one missile while others
are ignored.
In addition to the responsibilities such as approving weapon assignments and
authorizing weapon firings, the command center may also be involved in the exchange
of a large volume of information about the location of missiles as viewed from each
sensing platform. The measurements made by the sensors can be combined or "fused"
in the battle management system in order to improve the completeness and accuracy of
tracking the RVs and their battle assessment. Major Pat Gandee, in his thesis on air
defense, described this as a critical function within a geographically distributed C2
system. He termed this as the "crosstell process" and defined it as:
That process which provides for sharing of information throughout the C2
svstem to support decision making. The process can *also support
implementation or those decisions. [RefV~7: p. 38]
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This shared information will provide the area commander a complete picture
of the current situation. I would like to emphasize that this C2 system would be
geographically bounded and would not be responsible for the entire spectrum of
weapons, sensors and communication systems of the ballistic missile defense.
Higher level coordination is not seen in Figure 4.1, however, it must exist to
control the entire SDI system. A few passing comments are in order to describe how
this coordination might take place.
For threat assessment a report would be furnished to higher authorities in the
hierarchy detailing the status of the command center and its systems and the local
situation. The higher-level battle manager would combine the threat assessments from
the local command centers and any other national collection sensors to present a
condensed threat assessment to the national command authority. This level of
coordination will involve the collection and processing of massive information from
each of the command centers to possibly a central point, or command post. It will
provide a means of keeping the higher levels informed and up to date on the battle
situation as seen from the command centers and sensors. These layers of individual C2
systems make up the entire overall SDI C2 system. As one can see, this increases the
complexity of the BM/C3 system needed to support and control the entire SDI system.
3. BM/C3 System Functions
The command and control system, of which the platform discriminator is a
part, is to gather information about the incoming reentry vehicles, analyze the
potential threat each reentry vehicle imposes upon the U.S. and direct forces to negate










Several of the functions correspond to those definitions stated by the SDIO
BM/C3 Working Group for Standards in the document Functional Decomposition.
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Others have been discussed, developed and defined in prior meetings, symposia and
research documents. The definitions I will be using are a combination of those
definitions defined by the Function Decomposition document and those defined in prior
meetings and reports. They are defined as:
a. WarningIAlert Function
This is the function in which the results of early warning systems produces
electronic or visual evidence that the enemy has launched an attack; define launch
location, order of battle, and intensity as a function of time for initiation of the battle;
provide track, data for hand-off to other vehicle tracking systems.
b. Acquire
This is the function in which searches are carried out by passive or active
sensors until the presence of objects in the area under surveillance is established.
[Ref. 7: p. 34]
c. Track
This function establishes and maintains continuous contact with detected
objects; establishes location, state vector and trajectory of the detected object; assigns
trajectory identification symbol for common reference. [Ref. 7: p. 34]
d. Discriminate! Classify
This function obtains data on the trajectory histories, passive and active
signatures and interactive response of tracked objects; target classification must occur.
[Ref. 9: p. 34]
e. Threat Assessment
This function determines the impact points and evaluates the threats posed
by detected targets; target prioritation takes place in accordance with a preplanned
priority strategy. [Ref. 9: p. 27]
/. Weapon Assignment
This function considers the best option of weapon system (space or ground-
based) given resource availability, capability and priority; pairs weapon system to
prioritized targets; response plan is implemented in accordance with established
priorities and specified strategy. [Ref. 9: p. 23]
g. Weapon Allocation
This function considers options (within the selected weapon system) and
pairs specified weapons to target after considering limited resource availability.
[Ref. 7: p. 34]
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h. Firef Weapon Control
This function provides target data to weapon systems and directs the firing
and launching of weapons. [Ref. 9: p. 30]
In effect, the above definitions correspond to the C2 process definition. It
reflects what the system is doing and the functions carried out by the C2 system-
sensing, assessing, generating, selecting alternatives, planning and directing. Identifying
and defining these functions early on will become useful when applying the VICES to
the Platform Manager Program C2 system. This will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter Five.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have introduced the problem of addressing the BM/C3 system,
as a whole, for a system the size envisioned for the SDI project. For this reason, I
found a smaller BM/C3 system that could be applied to the MCES to address similar
C2 issues as that of the larger SDI BM/C3 system. This smaller BM/C3 system would
operate in the same environment under the similar conditions as the larger system, but
at a lower level. I described the "pop-jap" platform in some detail to explain its
operations and the components it must interact with as a BM/C3 system. The final
section of this chapter identified several functions a BM ,C3 system must complete to
command and control resources in the pursuit of a mission. Since Chapter 2 explained
the MCES methodology and this chapter provides and overview of the PMP concept,
I'm now ready to apply the MCES methodology to the PMP C2 system to identify
measures to evaluate the performance of the system.
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V. THE BM/C3 PROBLEM
A. THE MISSION
Deterring a Soviet attack against U.S. forces or cities is the primary mission of
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). If that fails, the SDI system must protect the
United States from a nuclear attack. The elements within this mission include the
enemy's ballistic missile threat, its goals and a ballistic missile defense (BDM) that
must deny the enemy its goals. Within minutes of a Soviet ballistic missile launch, the
Soviets could destroy various elements within our force structure. Targets include
missile silos, cities, ground based assets such as command, communication, and
surveillance centers, or the SDI weapon and sensor systems themselves.
The battle management and the command and control system of the SDI system
must help decision makers identify a ballistic missile attack, determine the threat they
pose to the U.S. and direct sufficient weapons to negate the attack in a near real-time
environment. Two kinds of attack are of concern to U.S. planners. The first is an
unexpected attack against forces on day-to-day status, rather than a generated alert
status. This attack could include an accidental outbreak of war, although a deliberated
attack is thought to be more likely. The second kind of attack is the preemptive strike,
made during a crisis in which the Soviets fear that war is imminent and that striking us
first is the best course of action to reduce damage to themselves. The Soviets may
attempt to disguise their attack by launching debris or decoys or they may try to
saturate the BMD beyond its capacity, or a combination of both. Therefore, the SDI
system and its associated BM/C3 architecture must be able to handle any influx of
enemy missiles at any time such that forces can be directed to counter it.
Several C2 issues must be addressed when trying to determine the BM/C3
architecture that will provide the battle manager with the most timely, accurate and
complete information needed for him to effectively use his forces. The remainder of
this chapter will address some of these BM/C3 issues by applying the MCES
methodology to a small BM/C3 system, comprising of a "pop-up" platform as the
sensor system, a weapon system and a command center. This system will be
comparatively much smaller than the BM/C3 system required to command and control
the SDI system in its entirety, however, many of the issues that will be discussed on
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this system are the same as those that must be addressed in analyzing any SDI BM/C3
architecture. The seven-module MCES methodology will be used to analyze the
functions and processes required to complete the mission of the BM/C3 system and
identify possible measures that can be used to evaluate the BM/C3 architecture. By
identifying the system functions, the C2 process and possible measures, simulation
models and experiments can be developed to evaluate the effectiveness as a command
and control system. These will be discussed only at the Sandia Platform Manager
Program (PMP) concept level.
B. MCES APPLICATION
1. Problem Statement
Based on the need to evaluate SDI C2 systems, a general problem statement
can be formulated:
How autonomous can the command and control svstem be if manv of the
decision makins capabilities are shifted to the computational capabilities of the
platform manager (onboard the discriminator platform) and the command center.
The PMP system is a single layer portion of a multi-layer BM/C3 system. The
approach envisioned by a multi-layer defense is that each layer will be capable of
performing independently the basic functions described in Chapter 4.3. Recall, that the
second-tier defense must protect the U.S. against offensive weapons which have not
been killed in the proceeding phases of the defense. The major requirements behind
this type of architecture is it must not only survive, it must be effective in defending the
predetermined high-priority sites or areas.
Applying the MCES to the Sandia National Laboratory's PMP concept will
not only identify which systems are performing which functions, but it will provide
guidance on identifying and selecting measures to evaluate the performance of the
system. If the performance of the system can be quantified and a standard can be
established to assess that performance, then the effectiveness of the system can be
evaluated.
If all alternative C2 systems would have similar measures, comparisons of
those systems might determine which system is better for a particular scenario or
mission. This BM/C3 system is being designed to operate autonomously while
protecting a small area such as a group of ICBM missile launching sites. To simplify
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the analysis, it will consist of only one sensor system and one weapon system under the
responsibility of one commander in a command center.
2. Bounding the System
The primary objective of "bounding the system" is to delineate the difference
between the system being studied and its environment. As described in Chapter 2, the
onion-skin graphical representation is useful in showing the levels of the C2 systems.
Recall, JCS defines a C2 system as "consisting of facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the mission
assigned."
a. Onion-skin Representation
The C2 system with the pop-up platform, as seen in Chapter 4 Figure 4.1,
is only a part of the entire C2 system needed to manage and operate the large number
of weapons and sensors comprising the ballistic missile defense. Figure 5.1 shows how
this BM/C3 system fits into the overall military command and control structure. The
system being analyzed is designed to intercept targets in the late mid-course phase of
the missile's trajectory. Other BM/C3 systems must be developed to handle the targets
in the boost, post-boost or terminal phases of the ballistic missile trajectory.
A separate command and control structure would have to be identified for
the ballistic missile defense. This could be called the Strategic Defense Command
System (SDCS). It would provide the means through which the SDCS commander
sends and receives information and exercises command of the space, air and ground-
based systems by transmitting his decisions to lower-echelon SDI C2 systems.
Although the overall BM/C3 architecture may be unique in its particular mission, the
lower level BM/C3 systems, such as the PMP system, which is designed for mid-course
interception, must all be implemented to assist the SDCS commander in planning,
directing and coordinating his forces in pursuit of the mission-protect vital assets of
the United States. This is turn must be incorporated into the National Military
Command Structure (NMCS).
The National Military Command System (NMCS) is the primary means by
which the National Command Authority (President and Secretary of Defense)
commands and controls the forces of the United States. The Department of Defense is
the military organization that provides the forces to protect and defend the interests of
the country. The purpose of the DOD is to maintain and employ the military
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ENVIRONMENT
Figure 5.1 Onion Skin Representation.
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instrument of the national power under the direction of the President, as Commander
in Chief, and the Secretary of Defense and in response to the legislative mandates of
the Congress. This is done through the World-Wide Military Command and Control
System - WWMCCS.
The WWMCCS is an arrangement of personnel, equipment (including
automated data processing equipment and software), communications, facilities and
procedures employed in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling the
operational activities of U.S. military forces. It is intended to provide the NCA a
capability to: [Ref. 11: p. 58]
(a) receive warning and intelligence information
(b) apply the resources of the military departments
(c) assign military missions
(d) provide direction to the Unified and Specified Commands
In other words, WWMCCS provides the NCA a means to perceive the
national security environment and control the military resources of the nation.
As the primary component of the NMCS, the WWMCCS is composed of
command and control systems of the Unified and Specified Commands, Headquarters
of Service Component Commands, our Triad forces, North American Defense,
(NORAD) and other DOD agencies. If the Strategic Defense Command System is
developed, it, too, must be integrated into the NMCS. Although these individual C2
systems are configured and operated generally to meet the requirements of the
command agency or department being served, the first priority of each of these systems
is to support the NMCS.
Encasing our government and military system is the outside world. This
includes not only allied and neutral countries, but also possible hostile countries with
nuclear and conventional destruction capabilities. If a ballistic missile defense is to be
employed, it must be incorporated into our national political and military goals and in
the context of world-wide stability. It must not undermine or threaten friendly
countries nor hamper future political and military relations with them.
In short, the C2 systems of the DOD are the means by which our military
commanders, under the direction of the President, employ the military strength of our
nation. Any ballistic missile defense and its command and control system must be
integrated into the NMCS and must be a military instrument of national power under
the direction of the NCA through the NMCS. The BM/C3 system being analyzed here
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must be a part of the entire battle management and command, control and
communication architecture for the SDI system.
b. Physical Entities
In bounding the system, I've constructed a simplified version of a
command and control system in using the PMP concept. The C2 system being
addressed will have only one surveillance, one sensor, one weapon system and one
command center. See Figure 5.2 . All the functions that must be accomplished to
complete its mission must be completed by one of these four systems. Although this
severely restricts the number of components interacting within the system, system
integrity is maintained and the complexity of command and control issues remain easily
identifiable.
Physical entities of the system include not only the equipment and facilities
but also the software and the people. The equipment would include the surveillance
system, the pop-up platform and its launching system, the weapon system, the built in
computer software and processors needed by each of the systems in order to operate,
and the communication equipment needed to interconnect the physical entities. The
command center would be the operational control facility of this system performing the
battle management functions while the operators would be the personnel maintaining
its readiness. The commander will be the ultimate decision-maker.
Software would include such things as command processing algorithms,
data management, vast amounts of storage and memory capabilities, databases and
input/ output formatting procedures. Algorithms would be built to perform such
functions as situation assessment, damage assessment, defensive firing strategies,
networking, and many others. If incorporated, the algorithms must deal with complex
rules of engagement and rapidly changing environmental conditions such that the
mission can be completed by the system. Due to the limited time any BM/C3 system
will have, the Eastport Study Group reported sensor measurements and the processing
of that data in an area of the size of the C2 system environment might require
updating the current situation every 10 milli-seconds or so. This is exceptionally fast,
however, it is well within today's computer technology and processing capabilitities.
[Ref. 2: p. 24]
Communication links and associated equipment would have to exist for
passing of data and information between entities and for control purposes. These






















command center and the launching system, the discriminator platform and the
command center, the command center and the weapon system, and possibly the
discriminator platform and the weapon system.
c. Structure
Identifying the "Structure" of this C2 system is another important step in
bounding the system. Structure is the arrangement and interrelationships of the
physical entities, standard operating procedures, information patterns and concept of
operations such that command of operations and functional representations are
established. For this system, structure may be reflected by information flow.
The surveillance, pop-up, and weapon system and the command center and
their interrelationships are also shown in Figure 5.2 . The solid lines represent control
lines while the dotted lines show connectivity through information and communication
flow patterns between the physical entities. Information of missile trajectories, possible
impact points and missile flight time would be needed by the launching system of the
discriminator platform. This would be used to determine the launch angle of the
platform, the trajectory the platform should follow, and the launch time of the
platform so incoming targets can be acquired by the platform. Detailed tracking files
would be essential information needed by the command center from the discrimnator
platform for threat assessment, prioritization of targets or weapon allocation. The
weapon system would be useless without the detailed tracking files and state vector
data used by the command center. This data may either be sent directly from the
discrimination platform or be passed to the command center and then up to the
weapon platform.
The surveillance system may be operated and controlled by the command
center of the C2 system described, or by a separate command facility altogether.
Although the command center in this C2 system may have the multi-role of being the
command facility of the surveillance system, the "pop-up" platform and its launching
system, and the weapon system, this analysis will limit the role of the command
center's responsibility to the pop-up and the weapon system. It is for this reason that
no solid line connects the surveillance system with the command center but one does
connect the launching platform with the command center.
The command center will have limited control over the launching of the
"pop-up" platform and firing of the weapon system. The commander of the command
center is the "man-in-the-loop" of this C2 system. The intial approach to this C2
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system is to have the system operate autonomously, if needed, with little to no
guidance or direction by the commander. However, man must be able to control the
system to prevent accidental launching or firing of systems. A way this could be
incorporated is to allow the commander to have direct control of the launching of the
pop-up platform and the firing of weapons. The commander may prevent the
launching of the platform or the firing of the weapon system, or have the system run
autonomously with minimum human interaction. In otherwords, the commander may
override the entire system by preventing the systems from completing their functions,
like detection, threat assessment, or fire/weapon control.
If the C2 system is to operate with little or no human intervention, the
pop-up platform, weapon system and command center must be designed to operate
autonomously. This will require the passing of information between the systems for
total coordination. Direct data relay channels must be established between the
surveillance system to the launching platform and the discriminator platform to the
command center and the weapon system for transmission of data. The data paths are
shown by the dotted lines connecting those entities. The "pop-up" platform will receive
target information and data from the surveillance system and use that data for
launching purposes. This data and information might include the types, state vectors,
velocities, launch points, and initial predicted impact points of each target, the number
of targets, and time of flight for each target. The dedicated discrimination platform is
being designed not only to discriminate the types of targets, but also to track the
targets for use by the weapon system.
The detailed tracking data of each reentry vehicle in the area must be sent
to the command center for management and allocation of weapon release. This data
will be more defined than that data sent to the platform system from the surveillance
system. It might include state vectors, classification, velocities, and time to impact of
each tracked object, and any other pertinent data required to maximize weapon
allocation and ultimately, the interception of the incoming targets by the weapon. A
dotted line between the sensor and the command center represents this connection. In
addition, if a link is established between the discriminator platform and the weapon
system, the same tracking information may also be sent to the weapon system.
Therefore, the command center and the weapon system will be receiving the same
tracking data at approximately the same time. This will save valuable processing time
required if the information were to follow a single path of going from the platform to
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the command center, and then to the weapon system. Implementation of both of these
links may be ideal as back up and for redundancy purposes.
3. Command and Control Process
I can use the the functions identified earlier to develop this system's "C2
process." The functions were discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.3 and won't be
reiterated here, however, a short review is necessary. In Chapter 4, several functions









When the system is completing these functions, either individually or several
at a time, the C2 system is considered to be in a dynamic state. Figure 5.3 graphically
depicts the ordering of the functions. This particular C2 process will form the
execution level C2 process for control of the weapon system.
Due to bounding of the system—one sensor, one weapon system and one
command center—the WEAPON ASSIGNMENT function has been deleted from the
C2 loop for this analysis. WEAPON ASSIGNMENT is the function that considers
the best option of available weapon systems and tasks a weapon system to a specific
target. Within this C2 system, only one weapon system is being considered, so
assignment of a weapon system to a target is not required. During the WEAPON
ALLOCATION function, the capabilities of the weapon will be evaluated and, if
correct conditions exist, individual weapons will be paired to a target.
Before continuing, a quick review of the C2 Process Model will explain the
relationships I will develop in mapping the functions to the Model. The C2 process
model (Figure &cmm ) was described in Chapter 2. In short, SENSE is the extracting
of signals from the environment. PROCESS and ASSESS are the functions which act
upon those signals to attempt to extract meaning about the intentions and disposition
of the environment. Alternative courses of actions are developed (GENERATE



















Figure 5.4 Command and Control Process Model.
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necessary to execute the selected course of action are identified and developed (PLAN
function). Finally, the DIRECT function distributes the decisions to the forces.
At this point, I'm ready to relate the command and control process of this
system to the Conceptual C2 Process Model. A mapping between these two processes
is illustrated in Figure 5.5 . A listing of the relationships is presented below:
(a) SENSE corresponds to ACQUIRE
(b) PROCESS corresponds to TRACK and DISCRIMINATE/CLASSIFY
(c) ASSESS corresponds to THREAT ASSESSMENT
(d) GENERATE/SELECT corresponds to ALLOCATE WEAPON
(e) DIRECT corresponds to FIRE/WEAPON CONTROL
Major Gandee stated, "The PLAN function has been eliminated because it
does not correspond to this level of the C2 system" in his analysis of the air defense C2
problem. This is also applicable to this C2 system. The Plan will be set by a higher
level C2 process where the decision maker at that level must make trade-offs on
priorities and resources and consider strategies which will support or coordinate with
other wariighting missions. For example, Rules of Engagements (ROEs) might state
that reentry vehicles directed towards any missile silo must be sought after and
intercepted before those directed towards C3 assets or those directed towards major
cities. This plan would be injected into the battle management aspect of the command
center of the C2 system to allocate specific weapons to prioritized targets.
The C2 process just described is an execution level C2 process which directly
controls defense resources. This C2 process is designed to operate independently in
accordance with higher echelon priorities.
4. Integration of Statics and Dynamics
The fourth step is to integrate the three dimensions of the C2 system—physical
entities, structure and the C2 process. In reviewing the C2 process, the hierarchal
structure is defined. The weapon system can not perform its functions without
tracking data from the command center or the sensor system and the approval of
operations by the commander of the command center. The discriminator platform can
not perform its functions of tracking or discriminating targets if it isn't launched. The
pop-up system won't be launched unless a surveillance system indicates a possible
ballistic threat is within its area and, again, the commander's approval to take such
action. In general, data, in the form of commands and information, must be past





















Figure 5.5 Mapping Between Processes.
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composition is beyond the scope of this analysis, the functions can be performed by the
entities if the data is timely, accurate and complete.
Thus, the functions of the C2 process can be matched to the physical entities.
The discriminator platform performs the DETECT and PROCESS functions. The
command center completes the ASSESS, GENERATE, SELECT and DIRECT
functions. Lastly, the weapons system is our "force", which interacts with the
environment. See Figure 5.6 .
5. Identification of Measures
a. Overview
Specifying the measures necessary to address the BM/C3 system is the
intent of this section. Four types of measures are possible. Two are measured inside
the boundary of the C2 system, i.e., dimensional parameters and measure of
performances, while the other two are measured outside the boundary of the C2
system, i.e., measure of C2 effectiveness and measure of force effectiveness. I will
identify measures of force effectiveness, effectiveness and performance for the C2
system being analyzed.
b. Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFEs)
At every level there is at least one "measure" which indicates how well a
system is doing. The effect of the last C2 process function, FIRE/WEAPON
CONTROL, can be a measure of force effectiveness by looking at the battle outcome
of an attack. This could be measured by "the number of targets that were engaged per
unit of time." However, that measure does not include the weapon's probability of kill.
Even if a weapon intercepts a target, the measure wouldn't reveal the number of
weapons that failed to destroy the target, as compared to those that succeeded in
destroying the target. Nor would this measure indicate whether the right targets were
intercepted. So a better measure of force effectiveness might include:
(a) Expected percent of threat value destroyed by available weapons; or
(b) Expected percent of threat value protected by available weapons
These two measures of force effectiveness of the system relate to the
accomplishment of the mission.
c. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)
































Figure 5.6 Functions Corresponding to Physical Entities.
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A sood starting point for developing measures is to look at the C2 Process. The
C2
w
process is a" group of functions which are required to control the force within
the environment. If one can measure the capabilities to do all the functions, this
represents a measure of the abilitv to control the force within the environment.
Thus, the ability to perform the entire C2 process is measured by a set of MOEs
for the C2 system of interest."
[Ref. 7: p. 66]
This is the approach I'm taking to identify measures of effectiveness. Two
important aspects of this system became apparent in looking at the C2 process, and if
measured, could determine the effectiveness of the system. One was the "timeliness" at
which one could proceed through the functions of the C2 process. Once the system
has received a stimulus, such as a command to launch the pop-up platform from the
command center, no response can be delivered before a necessary amount of time has
elapsed. In other words, each function will experience some time delay. The total of
those time delays must not be so long that- the target is no longer within the system's
"window of opportunity". The window of opportunity is defined as the moment the
reentry vehicle is within the area of coverage, or range of the weapon system to the
moment when the vehicle leaves the weapon's area of coverage. The C2 system must
complete its C2 process in su^h time that the weapon can engage the threatening
reentry vehicle before it either leaves the outer limits of the weapon range or impacts
upon the Earth. To maximize the effectiveness of a C2 system, one would minimize
the time delays to complete the C2 process.
Two types of time delays are present: time delays in the completion of each
function, such as detecting, tracking, discriminating, or classifying, the reentry vehicles
and threat assessments, as examples; and time delays in information transfer between
entities. Information transfer delays are associated with sending specific types of
information between specific entities, such as finished tracks from the sensor to the
command center. These can be estimated by examining the messages and available
times between each entity. With these two time delays in mind, the first measure of
effectiveness is:
Time between the moment the C2 svstem receives a stimulus from the command
center or surveillance svstem that" the platform should be launched, to the
moment it can deliver a response to this stimulus bv launching a specific weapon
to intercept the threatening target.
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The ability of the system to act upon a stimulus represents the "timeliness'
of the system. This measure is quantifiable and could be calculated by summing the
times of the individual functions of the C2 process. This implies that the time delays
that contribute to this "expected time" are a function of the entities (software,
hardware, subsystems, communication mediums, etc.) that data must pass through and
between to complete the C2 process.
It may not be sufficient that this C2 system is fast enough, in order for
good, preplanned and automated decisions be made, the C2 system must provide
"accurate" information and support. Quality of information is particularly important
in two functions: the ASSESSMENT and WEAPON ALLOCATION functions. The
ASSESSMENT function must accurately estimate/predict a number of unknowns such
as missile launch points, target impact points and possible interception points, and
classification of the target type. The WEAPON ALLOCATION function relies on
quality of data for proper re'source tasking. This is an extremely critical function
because it attempts to optimize interceptor deployment. Data quality has a direct
impact of optimizing intial target engagement sequencing and weapon, threat matches
in space and time.
In addition to the MOEs that evaluate the ability to perform the C2*
process, there are other effectiveness measures that relate the physical entities of the C2
system to the overall system effectiveness. These include system survivability and
availability. Both of these measures would represent a probability that the system will
perform its intended function for a specific interval under stated conditions. Since
these terms have many meanings, the following definitions seem appropriate for this
study:
(a) Availabilitv - the svstem can provide continuous performance at anv time in a
benign environment. (Ref)
(b) Survivabilitv - the svstem can provide continuous performance in a hostile
environment while under attack. (Ref)
Availability deals with the reliability and maintainability aspects of the
system. Reliability measures would reflect the probability of uninterrupted
performance during deployment, mean time between failure, the dependability or
reliability of the sensor, weapon systems, command center and the software in each of
the these systems and the reliability of the communication links imbedded in the C2
system. Maintainability measures would address issues such as mean time to repair
and the probability of uninterrupted performance during maintenance, replacement or
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enhancements. A measure of availability would be a coupling of both reliability and
maintainability.
While availability deals with maintainability and reliability, survivability
deals with the system's resistance to elements of threat. A possible measure might be
"probability surviving an attack on the C2 system". These would include vulnerability
aspects such as attacks or countermeasure activities directed towards the entities or any
communication or data links connecting the entities of the system. In addition, self
protection capabilities, such as hardening, shielding, dispersion and silent spares for the
platform and the weapon system, physical and operational security for the command
center, and the ability to detect hostile activity directed towards the defense assets
would be of concerned to the decision maker. Taking into account such survivability
and availability aspects, representative measures would indicate the system's ability to
continue to operate after an attempt " to disable it. Possible availability and
survivability measures are listed in Table 8 .
TABLE 8
AVAILABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY MEASURES
* Probability of sensor availability
* Probability of weapon system availability
* Probability of software availability on sensor system
* Mean time to failure and mean time to repair
* Probability of uninterrupted performance during deployment
* Probability of uninterrupted performance during maintenance
d. Measure of Performance {MOPs)
Within the C2 boundary, individual C2 functions must be performed to
complete the C2 process for any given attack. For a command and control system
such as the one being analyzed, results of the functions could be considered possible
MOPs. Each of these measures, identified individually by functions, contribute to the
overall MOE. The possible measures are listed in Tables 9 and 10 by the entities that
complete the functions. Table 9 lists the MOPs for the ACQUIRE, TRACK, and
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TABLE 9
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE - PLATFORM
ACQUIRE
Time from launch to initial detection of object
Probability of detecting an object given an object was present
Probability of not detecting an object that was present
Probability of false detection (detecting an "target" that
was not present, e.g. sun, star)
Processing rate to initialize detected object
Percentage of targets detected
TRACK
Time required to develop track, file
Track file update rate
Percent error in accuracy of state vector/track file
DISCRIMINATE/CLASSIFY
Time from target acquisition to threat designation
Probability of correctly discriminating a decoy given a decoy target
Probability of discriminating a RV given a decoy target
Probability of correctly discriminating a RV given a RV target
Probability of discriminating a decoy given a RV target
Processing rate to discriminate a target given a detection
Processing rate to classify a live warhead
Percent of targets discriminated given tracking files
Probability of accurately specifying impact point prediction
Percent error of impact point predictions and actual impact point
Probability of correctly classifying a reentry vehicle
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TABLE 10
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE - COMMAND CENTER
ASSESS THREAT
Time to determine the threat value given response plan
Probablity of correctly determining threat value given plan response
Probability of correctly prioritizing threat value given response plan
Processing time to determine the threat value given response plan
WEAPON ALLOCATION
Time to pair individual weapon with target
Probability of correctly prioritizing target given response plan
Probability of allocating weapons given prioritized target data
Probability of overkill - shooting the same target twice
FIRE/WEAPON CONTROL
Time for engagement authorization to weapon firing on given target
Percent error in state vector/track, file handover to weapon system
DISCRIMINATE/CLASSIFY functions completed on the platform. Table 10 lists the
MOPs for the ASSESS, WEAPON ALLOCATION and FIRE;WEAPON CONTROL
functions completed by the command center. Note that each function has a time
measure associated with its function. In order to complete each function, a delay in
time must occur. These "time" MOPs would be used in quantifying the overall time
MOE. The other MOPs represent the accuracy with which each function complete its
task or the probability of attempting the task given the previous function was
completed. Many of the accuracy measures are stated by the "percent error" of
correctly doing a task or the probability of doing the task at all.
This section would not be complete without relating the MOPs to the
MOEs. Theoretically, functional performances should be combined to get the overall
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effectiveness measures. To explain the relationships between MOPs to the MOEs, the


















V7y WINDOW OF OPPORTUNrTY
Figure 5.7 Timeline Analysis to Complete the C2 Process.
Time was based on how fast one could react to a stimulus. If all the
individual functional delay times were added, the summation would be a represent the
7S
time to complete the C2 process. This value would be useful in evaluating whether the
system is capable of acting in timely manner. "Timely", in this case, means that the
decision to act on a stimulus must be done within a time frame such that the target is
within the weapon's engagement zone. This can be seen by the timeline in Figure 5.7 .
The heavy dark line at the bottom represents the time to complete each of the
individual functions of the C2 process. The distances representing time are strictly for
graphical purposes only and are not to imply that one function will take longer or less
time than another. The top dark line indicated the interceptor opportunity time. This
represents the available time the interceptor can engage the target, which depends on
weapon system and target positions as well as the target course and the interceptor
course. This line could be very short if the range of the interceptor is short or if the
distance between the weapon system and the target is long. The control function on
the C2 time line extends to a point where the weapon system releases its kill vehicle,
which signifies that the C2 process is complete. If a weapon system is fired, the
weapon will flyout and, hopefully, intercept the target. If interception was completed,
it would be at the point of the far right side of the "interceptor flyout" heavy dark line.
The measures identified in this section are not conclusive. More measures
could be identified and defined. The intent was to introduce the concept of identifying
measures oriented towards the functional aspects of the C2 system, such as time and
accuracy, and those measures directed towards the entities of the system, such as
availability and survivability.
6. Data Generation
At this point, values for the measures or variables identified in the previous
section must be generated. Several types of data generators are available. These could
include an experiment to test the PMP system concept, computer simulations to model
the enemy's threat and the performance of the functions, entities and C2 process
accomplished by the C2 system, or lastly, subjective judgements based on the
experience and knowledge of the designers or analysts.
One possible method to generate data for the C2 system being analyzed would
be to subject the platform's sensors, computer processing capabilities, and battle
management functions to a simulated Soviet attack. The simulation could include
using available resources at the Sandia National Laboratory. The sensors would
operate in a simulated real-time environment. Data from the sensors would be
processed for tracking and discrimination purposes. The representative battle manager
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would use the resultant data for fire control and weapon allocation. Throughout the
simulation, data would be recorded for analysis of the system. The simulation could
stop short of integrating the weapon system because the weapon's performance could
be tested separately with the data produced by this experiment as the input to a
weapons test. The intent of the simulation would be to generate values for the
previously defined evaluation measures and to test the technologies of the system.
At this stage of the development of the platform manager by Sandia National
Labs, computational models are being used throughout the design of the system to
estimate the technological cababilities and operational aspects of the platforms sensors
and the onboard manager. An example of this is Dr. Richard Wheeler's efforts to
analyze the different methods or algorithms the charged particle beam can be
sequenced or pointed to discriminated the randomly scattered targets. These generate
data through computational analysis.
For BM/C3 systems, there are significant problems with availability of data.
Since the program is in the conceptual phase and nothing has been set in concrete,
certain data, like operational characteristics and performance standards are unavailable
for analysis purposes. Under these circumstances, SDIO has initiated and supported
the SDI National Test Bed (NTB). The intent of the NTB was to have designated
laboratories with the analytical tools and resources available to model and test BM/C3
systems and subsystems capabilities and the overall force effectiveness of such systems.
Two vital purposes have been identified for the NTB:
1. Demonstrate and Evaluate
- SDI BM/C3 Architectures
- Key Defensive Technologies
2. Support an Informal Full Scale Development
(FSD) Decision in the Early l990's(Ref 2)
Figure 5.S shows the proposed NTB. The National Test Facility (NTF) will
be the "headquarters" of the NTB and will be located at the Consolidated Space
Operations Center (CSOC) at Falcon Air Station, twenty miles east of Colorado
Springs, Colorado. Facilities at different locations will be connected to it via
computer/communication links. These connected facilities will include White Sands
National Laboratory (WSNL), Vanderburg Air Force Base (VAFB) and Kirkland Air
Force Base (KAFB). The development phase of the NTB doesn't begin until later this




























Figure 5.8 SDI National Test Bed.
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The NTB could be the data generator for evaluating the PMP concept and its
associated BM/C3 architecture. The testbed will subject proposed architectures to
various enviromental conditions expected during the launching of USSR ballistic
missiles while analyzing measurable variables in an attempt to recognize important
issues in evaluating a C2 system. Experimental designs and simulation models will
address the measures stated for the test at hand.
The first tests the NTB will run will be smaller simulation models that have
compatible software/hardware capabilities. This may be appropriate for the beginnings
of the PMP testing and experimentation.
7. Data Aggregation
As a final step, meanings must be assigned to the values of the measures to
identify what this says about our system. Some measures, when applied throughout
the C2 process, are aggregable measures. For example, an overall reaction time, or
response time, may equal the time for the sensor to detect a target added to the time
for the platform manager to assess the targets threat status, added to other time
intervals to get an overall time delay value. This time delay must not be so long that
the weapon system can't engage the target before it detonates or impacts upon the
Earth. If this were the case, the system is a failure in an operational capacity and
efforts would have to be directed to reduce the time delay or reconsider the possibility
of developing a successful BM/C3 system.
In turn, this would have a direct impact on the measure of force effectiveness.
If the reaction time of the C2 system is too slow, the weapon system wouldn't be able
to destroy the target. Then the measure of threat value protected by the C2 system
would be minimal, reflecting the ineffectiveness of the forces of the entire system.
The results of the experiments could also be used to determine the key issues
directly effecting the measures used to evaluate the command and control of a SDI
system. By aggregating the data, additional factors might become relevant and interact
with the system in such a way that those, too, might need to be analyzed individually.
New insights and issues once-thought irrelevant might play an important role in




This chapter applies the MCES methodology to a SDI C2 system designed for
the midcourse phase of a trajectory. The system was analyzed according to the
methodology's seven module step through process. Specifying the measures to
evaluate the system was the main objective of this methodology. Several measures,
such as timeliness, accuracy, survivability and availability, were identified to indicate
the effectiveness of the system, while measures of performance were selected to
evaluate the accomplishment of the individual functions of the C2 process. In turn,




This thesis addresses the need for evaluation measures for BM/C3 systems of the
SDI project. Without such measures, any assessment of a command and control
system would be inaccurate and incomplete. A specific analysis structure, the Modular
Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) was used as a guide to identify
possible measures to be used to evaluate a specific C2 system being researched and
developed by Sandia National Laboratories, called the Platform Manager Program. I'll
first start with the MCES by looking at how the MCES has been applied to this C2
system.
B. APPLICATION OF THE MCES EVALUATION STRUCTURE
The MCES is a tool to be used by staff officers tasked with evaluating alternative
C2 architectures. The intent behind the methodology is to assess the effectiveness of a
specific system through a detailed evaluation of its C2/C3 architecture. Architecture
has been defined as "an integrated set of systems whose physical entities, structure and
functionality are coherently related." Sharing this common terminology allows direct
application of the VICES methodology to actual and proposed architecture problems.
Dr. Sweet has written several manuals explaining her efforts in evolving the
MCES methodology to what it is today. Much of her work was combined in the this
thesis to describe the methodology and subsequently, used in this SDI BM/C3
application effort.
At the SDI MCES/MOE Workshop, the BM/C3 Systems Working Group
applied the MCES to develop measures to be used in the evaluation of the effectiveness
of alternative BM C3 architectures. Although the Working Group identified and
developed several generic measures, there was evidence that in order to solve the
dilemma of which systems should be incorporated into the overall BM/C3 architecture,
one would have to identify measures to evaluate BM/C3 subsystems, generate data to
put a comparison value on those measures and then aggregate the data to determine
the effectiveness of each BM/C3 architecture. The Workshop provided the framework
behind this thesis, however, instead of looking at the full spectrum of the SDI BM C3
architecture, I narrowed my views by looking at a lower level C2 system with few
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subsystems. After speaking with the developers of the PMP concept at the Sandia
National Laboratories, I set off to identify lower level system measures.
I extensively used Major Pat Gandee's thesis entitled, "Evaluation Methodology
for Air Defense Command and Control System" in proceeding through the modules of
the MCES. In many aspects, I felt several of the functions accomplished by the air
defense C2 system were comparable to the functions accomplished by the ballistic
missile defense C2 system. Many of the definitions used in his thesis were incorporated
into this thesis
,
however, all of them were tailored to fit the SDI C2 system.
C. MEASURES CONCEPT REVIEW
The MCES descriptions of the MOP, MOE, and MOFE, and the concept of the
relationships between these measures and the boundaries of the system was used in the
identification and development of the measures. The guidelines provided by the MCES
were such that measures of performance were measured inside the boundary of the C2
system while the measures of effectiveness and force effectiveness were outside the
boundary of the system.
This thesis interpreted the boundaries of the C2 system in terms of the system's
physical entites, such as weapon and sensor system and the command center and the
C2 process with the individual functions it would perform. MOPs would measure the
performance of the individual functions of the C2 process through the identification of
the entity that is accomplishing that function. MOEs would measure the capability to
do all of the functions as one. MOEs for the functional aspects of the system include
timeliness and accuracy while MOEs for the entities related to the survivability and
reliability aspects of the system.
D. SYSTEM BOUNDING REVIEW
I had restricted the number of subsystems in this C2 system such that only one
command level was being represented. Although technological constraints might
restrict the initial deployment of the SDI system to a very limited number of weapon
and sensor systems, by no means will the SDI system remain at one command level.
Many of the topics discussed throughout this document addressed several generic C2
system level issues but at a lower level. The integration of different levels is what
makes the SDI BM/C3 architecture problem so vast. This thesis could easily be
expanded upon to further address evaluation measures at either a different level or a
combination and interaction between levels.
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One example would be to expand the boundaries to include not just one platform
system and one weapon system under the control of one command center, for the
interception of reentry vehicles during the late mid-course phase, as was the approach
of this thesis, but to include several platforms and weapons systems for the same
phase. Another would be to increase the boundaries to include not only those systems
that are in direct support of the midcourse phase, but include those systems that will
be designed for the boost and terminal phases. Its obvious that those system would
have to share intelligence data, accurate target information and coordinate activities in
a timely manner to be effective as a system in destroying threatening warheads.
The application of the MCES to the PMP concept as a C2 system has been
relatively straight forward, however, not complete. There are other issues that must be
addressed by the designers of this system before a final evaluation plan can be
established for this system. One major issue is the possibility of the pop-up system
having multiple staring and/ or multiple LADAR sensor systems on board the platform.
This wouldn't change the measures of effectiveness I proposed to evaluate the system,
however, this could directly effect the performance of the system and most probably
the effectiveness of the system.
This all leads back, to the degree of autonomy the C2 systems of the BM/C3
architecture should have. If the autonomous C2 systems could be more effective in
protecting U.S. assets then those systems with a "man-in-the-loop," then the
autonomous systems should be considered for integration into the BM/C3 architecture.
Less communication links for operations, control and direction would be required and
the decision maker would be onboard the platform itself. This would greatly enhance
the survivability aspects of the C2 system.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has recapped the proceedings of the this thesis and has recaptured
the magnitude of the SDI BM/C3 architecture problem. No such "SDI" system exists
yet, however, efforts continue to not only make the system deployable, but to make it
the most effective svstem envisioned.
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Figure A.l Three Phase Ballistic Missile Trajectory.
A review of the physical characteristics of the strategic defense problem may be
needed to define the dimensions of a typical trajectory. For this document, the
trajectory of the missile will be divided into three dimensions, or phases. They are
called the boost, mid-course and terminal phases. The following paragraphs define the
dimensions of these areas, as used by most analysts in the SDI community. See Figure
A.l .
The first phase is the BOOST phase, which will last from 2.5 to 6 minutes
[Ref. 1: p. V-5]. In this phase, the first- and second-stage engines of the missile are
burning and producing intense infrared radiation that has distinctive spectral
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signatures. Although this phase only lasts a few seconds, research is addressing the
technological challenge of intercepting the ballistic missiles through the detection of the
emitted radiation. When the boost phase is completed, the missile releases a bus
containing on the order of 10 warheads and enemy "penetration aids," each into a
slightly different ballistic trajectory. Many analysts view this bus deployment as a
separate phase, commonly referred to as the POST-BOOST, or BUS DEPLOYMENT,
phase. This distinction is not needed for this document and will suffice as part of the
BOOST phase. Interception of the missile in the boost phase offers the advantage not
only of dealing with a larger target than a reentry vehicle, but also of eliminating the
many individual targets - reentry vehicles and decoys - that are launched from the bus
of a single missile.
During the MID-COURSE phase, the reentry vehicle and decoys follow ballistic
trajectories a few hundred kilometers above the atmosphere. This phase lasts anywhere
from 6 minutes for SLBMs to 25 minutes for ICBMs [Ref. 1: p. V-5]. During this
phase the incoming warhead must be discriminated from decoys. Those reentry
vehicles that are not intercepted at this phase will enter 'he final phase of the
trajectory, the terminal phase.
The TERMINAL phase is the final opportunity to detect and intercept the
incoming warheads. Upon entry into the Earth's atmosphere, this phase may last from
20 to 60 seconds [Ref. 1: p. V-5]. This is a very dynamic phase for the interception of
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